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Abstract
This paper employs ordered probit, partial adjustment, and vector
error correction models to characterize price adjustments in the Philippine
retail gasoline market since its deregulation. We find that pricing decisions
of oil firms depend significantly on eight weeks of previous changes in
crude cost. We show that the speed of adjustment of retail prices to its
long-run equilibrium relation with crude cost has been following an
accelerating trend but is vulnerable to intervening factors. Lastly, we
provide empirical evidence that pump prices respond quicker and more
fully to increases in crude cost rather than to decreases.
.
1  Introduction
The Philippine downstream oil industry was deregulated in February 1998 as part of a
general reform policy of liberalization and the retreat of the government from intervention2
in the market.
1 It was enacted to spur competition in the local market that has been
dominated by three major firms, and also to unload the government of the burden of price
subsidy as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) went into deficit. The primary
decontrol measure was that oil companies were now allowed to set prices, whereas
before, the government fixed prices through the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).
Figure 1: Daily Movements of Crude Price and Exchange Rate
                                                
1 This is not entirely correct since RA 8180, which was passed by Congress on April 1996, preceded the
currently observed RA 8479. The two essentially put forward the same action, but the former was nullified
on November 1997 as the Supreme Court found in it provisions that “inhibit fair competition, encourage
monopolistic power and interfere with the free interaction of market forces.” However, while the previous
law was in effect, and even after it was struck down, partial deregulation has actually taken place. See U


























































































































Dubai Crude Exchange Rate3
With the entry of new players in the country’s retail gasoline market, the public
expectation was that competitive pressures would push pump prices down; however, such
an event wasn’t actually in the offing. World crude prices started climbing in February
1999 and peaked only in November 2000 at more than thrice its previous value, no small
thanks to the output tightening orchestrated by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) cartel, while the peso steadily slid against the dollar since June 1999
(Figure 1). As crude import costs soared, so did retail gasoline prices move in a similar
trend.
2 Some consumers, however wrongly, took this as a post hoc ergo propter hoc
evidence of the folly of deregulation.
More so, there is an apparent consumer sentiment that pump prices are raised as
soon as crude oil prices have increased and/or the peso has depreciated, and they are kept
high for some time even if a rollback appears warranted given lower crude prices and an
appreciating peso. Not only that, the naïve observation is that the magnitudes of price
changes are relatively biased upwards for price hikes. Together with the coincidental if
not simultaneous
3 price adjustments of Petron, Shell and Caltex (the so-called Big Three),
not a few saw this as an indication of collusion among the dominant firms
4 to increase
                                                
2 The country relies on the foreign market for practically all of its crude requirements; domestic upstream
operations contributed just a little over one percent of total supply from 1990-2000.
3 Because of the public sensitivity to oil price hikes, the Department of Energy (DoE) monitors retail prices
and requires oil companies to give notice before any price adjustment is made, which is then relayed to the
media. Most of the time the public gets to know this even earlier since the retailers directly inform the
press ahead of any adjustment, possibly to gauge market response and condition the public of the eventual
change, or perhaps a signal to other firms of their action. See U (2000) for a discussion of game theoretical
focal pricing.
4 To break up such an oligopoly, there have been attempts in the legislature moving for the creation of a
National Oil Exchange, a company that will be given the sole authority to import crude oil and petroleum
products and manage the biggest oil depots. Downstream industry operators will then pay the same price
for the commodities, mainly competing in retailing. However, this does not address the issue of first-mover
advantages for the established firms, besides the usual arguments against a monopoly, government-owned
at that.4
profits, a worse situation than when prices were set by the government and mark-up was
maintained at a certain level.
These observations were rather uninformed because no empirical bases were
adequately provided. Pronouncements of the Consumer and Oil Price Watch (COPW)
regarding expected price adjustments merely noted cold calculations on the changes in
crude costs with allowances for some lag, and as such were static in nature, meaning no
corrections were considered to result from previous pricing actions.
5
In this paper we will seek to characterize retail gasoline price adjustments in the
country and determine if the deregulation of the industry has resulted in a faster
adjustment of retail prices to crude cost changes through time. Also, we investigate if an
asymmetric pricing behavior indeed prevails, wherein retail prices respond more quickly
to an increase in crude prices than to a decrease. These are done for the Big Three as well
as for minor players for comparison.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a short review of related
literature. Section 3 introduces the data used and some preliminary observations from a
cursory inspection. Section 4 summarizes the econometric models employed in this paper
to model the response structure of retail gasoline prices to crude oil price changes and to
check the existence of price asymmetry. Section 5 discusses the results of the models and
some implications. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
                                                
5 Using a base point is helpful, but its arbitrariness is untenable.5
2 Theory and Literature
There has been a fair amount of literature devoted to the study of pricing behavior in
retail gasoline markets. This is driven by social sensitivity to any kind of price volatility
or downward stickiness, more so in this case since gasoline is considered a vital
commodity for the movement of goods and people.
Gasoline sold in retail markets is a fairly homogenous good, with the additives
included in premium brands important to the average consumer only on the margin. With
many sellers and low entry and exit barriers, one would thus expect a competitive
outcome where retail prices are set equal to marginal cost and industry economic profits
are zero.
However, the demand for gasoline is price inelastic in the short run
6 and there are
significant costs associated with entering the industry, as well as locational advantages for
incumbent players. There is also the peculiarity of a supply structure that relies on a
depletable nonrenewable resource controlled by but a few extractors. Hence the situation
can actually deviate from the competitive outcome.
One indication of this is the phenomenon of asymmetric pricing wherein retail
gasoline prices respond more quickly when crude cost is rising than when it is falling.
Bacon (1991) found support for such a claim in the UK gasoline market. Karrenbrock
(1991); Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert (1997); Balke, Brown, and Yücel (1998); and
the Energy Information Administration (1999) all found similar results for the US market.
                                                
6 Estimates range from –0.1 to –0.2 (Dahl and Sterner, 1991).6
In contrast, Godby, Lintner, Stengos, and Wandschneider (1998) and the Conference
Board of Canada (2001) did not find any evidence in favor of such; the Canadian retail
gasoline market seemed competitive enough to eschew such a response pattern.
Some explanations posited for such a phenomenon are tacit collusion, search
costs, consumer response to changing prices, and market power. Industry players signal
their continued adherence to an unspoken agreement to maintain high profit margins by
hiking pump prices when crude prices increase, and reluctantly or slowly adjusting prices
downwards when crude costs decrease. Search costs concern the expensive and time-
consuming process consumers must engage in to find a lower-priced gasoline, the gain
from which is but a few centavos per liter, so that it will take some time before stations
are forced to lower their prices. Consumers may also accelerate their purchase of gasoline
when prices are rising thereby facilitating price hikes, and may buy gasoline much faster
when prices are falling so that prices fall slower.
Noel (2001) examined the dynamic pricing behavior in Canadian retail gasoline
markets and found that three distinct pricing patterns exist: (1) standard cost-based
pricing, (2) sticky pricing, and (3) steep, asymmetric retail price cycles. The latter had a
short and quick relenting phase followed by a long and slow undercutting phase and was
characterized by lower average markups compared to the other two. These were found to
be prevalent in markets with a greater penetration of small, independent firms. Borenstein
and Shepard (2002) studied the wholesale US gasoline market and showed that prices
adjusted more slowly in markets where there are higher price-cost margins, a proxy for
market power.7
3 Data and Preliminary Observations
This study examines retail pricing of unleaded gasoline in Metro Manila
7 for the period
beginning the third week of January 1999 (1/16/1999) and ending the first week of
February 2002 (2/02/2002), consisting of 160 observations. Prior to this date, only partial
deregulation has taken place, in the sense that an automatic pricing mechanism (APM)
put in place by the government as a pricing guide was observed.
DATA
Data were collected on daily crude cost from the Energy Industry Administration
Bureau (EIAB) of the Department of Energy (DoE). The price of medium Dubai crude
with API of 30.7 was used since it is regarded as the benchmark in Asia. Until July 1999
the EIAB used quotations from Reuters, they subscribed to Platts the month thereafter;
however, the correlation of the two price series from August to December 1999 (the
available overlap) was 94.3%.
Data on the daily exchange rate (weighted average) between the Philippine peso
and the US dollar were obtained from the Institute for Development and Econometric
Analysis, Inc. (IDEA) which archived it from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
The crude cost in pesos per liter (denoted as CRUDE) was computed by getting
the product of Dubai crude prices ($/barrel) and the exchange rate of the peso against a
dollar (P/$) and dividing it by 158.9 liters, the equivalent of a barrel.
                                                
7 Unleaded gasoline was chosen because it was a standard product offered by all retailers; leaded gasoline
was phased out starting April 2000. Data on retail prices were available only for Metro Manila.8
Data on the retail prices (pesos per liter), exclusive of the P4.35 excise tax levied
on unleaded gasoline throughout the period, of five downstream oil firms, namely Petron
Corporation, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, Caltex (Philippines) Incorporated,
TWA Incorporated (Flying V), and Seaoil Petroleum Corporation, were likewise sourced
from the EIAB-DoE.
8 As of yearend 2001, the last two have the most number of retail
gasoline stations in Metro Manila among the new players.
Weekly averages were computed for all the series to minimize the noise in daily
frequency data, with Saturday denoting the average of the day itself and the six days prior
to it. The crude price and exchange rate of the previous workday was used for weekends
and holidays. Since we are interested in the difference of pricing behavior between big
and small players, the unweighted mean of the retail prices of Petron, Shell and Caltex
(denoted as  RPBIG) and of Flying V and Seaoil ( RPSMALL) were computed. The
correlations between prices of the groups’ members were very high at 99.9%.
Throughout the period studied, the importation tax on both crude oil and
petroleum products has been a uniform 3% as mandated by Republic Act No. 8479.
However, former President Estrada reduced this to 0% for three months starting
November 8, 2000 via Executive Order No. 314 in an effort to contain the impact of
rising crude prices. Hence a dummy variable S was defined for the period 11/11/2000-
                                                
8 The bureau monitored prices by calling the retail gasoline stations of the different oil players in a
randomly chosen area within Metro Manila on the date of effectivity of the price adjustment given notice
them. Since locational differences had an effect on posted prices, ranges (price from lowest to highest)
were recorded for every petroleum product. The median of this was used as the retail price in the study. A
key assumption made was that no significant deviations from the recorded price happened in the period
between announced price changes. On-site monitoring of posted prices was also randomly done by the
EIAB to check on this.9
2/10/2001 since the import duty on crude oil and petroleum products was suspended
roughly during this period.
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
Using daily observations from 1/10/1999-2/2/2002, there have been 45 price
adjustments for major oil firms and 35 for new entrants (Table 1), once every 25 days for
the former and about once in every month for the latter. Prices can thus be considered
fixed or unchanging for about 96.5% of the time. Around 60% of price movements were
accounted for by upward adjustments. The absolute value of price adjustment is greater
for increases rather than decreases, with mean changes higher for small players.
Now using weekly data, if we observe closely the concurrent movements of retail
prices and crude cost through time (Figure 2), it appears that retail price adjustments do
not fully coincide with the direction of change in crude prices, especially at some turning
points. This mismatch indicates that there is a lag between gasoline prices and the
effective crude price relevant to the oil firms’ pricing decision; we would determine how
long this is in the study.
?0 >0 <0 ?0 >0 <0
Mean 0.1051 0.2874 -0.2253 0.1358 0.3837 -0.2361
Median 0.1267 0.3333 -0.2633 0.2500 0.3700 -0.2275
Minimum -0.4000 0.0017 -0.4000 -0.3775 0.1475 -0.3775
Maximum 0.8033 0.8033 -0.0450 0.7800 0.7800 -0.0925
Standard deviation 0.3022 0.1990 0.1147 0.3364 0.1611 0.0883
Skewness 0.0891 0.4142 0.3594 -0.0537 0.7196 0.0028
Kurtosis 2.0797 2.6641 1.8373 1.7033 2.9812 1.7876
No. of cases 45 29 16 35 21 14
?RP BIG ?RP SMALL
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Price Adjustments (Daily)10
Figure 2: Weekly Movements of Crude and Retail Prices
All throughout the sample, the gasoline prices posted by both groups have moved
closely together with one exception, the period between the weeks of 5/1/1999 and
8/21/1999 (the shaded area) when the retail price of the small players remained
unchanged while that of the big players steadily climbed. We may interpret this move as
an initial effort by the new entrants to gain market share
9 and assess the receptiveness of
the market, as a test of the incumbents’ market power.
The mean difference between retail prices and concurrent crude cost throughout
the period was P4.75 for the Big Three and P4.55 for the minor firms (Table 2). The
                                                
9 Indeed the combined market share of all industry players excluding the Big Three doubled in 1999 to
8.7% from 4.3% in the previous year, the highest yearly increment realized by the new players since their





































































minimum and maximum values were just the same higher for the former, with the latter
having a higher standard deviation. This represents the profit margin of the group and
other input costs
10 in the production of gasoline; if there are no significant changes in
input costs affecting the cost structure of the oil players, then we hypothesize that the
fluctuations reflect changes in the profit margin.
Looking at the graph in Figure 3, there is a marked widening in the average level
of this differential in January 2001 that clearly appears to have persisted since then. This
shift may be considered structural and hence can be attributed to a factor or combination
of factors that were introduced or that occurred in this point in time (or near it); however,
the appropriate lag length needs to be taken into account before any inference can be
reliably given.
                                                
10 One such input cost is the wages/salaries paid by the oil companies. During the period covered by the
study, there have been three adjustments in the minimum wage in the National Capital Region (NCR): on
October 31, 1999 (P198 increased to P223.50), November 1, 2000 (raised to P250), and on November 5,
2001 (hiked to P265).
Mean 4.7514 4.5457 0.2057
Median 4.3587 4.1794 0.1454
Minimum 2.8928 2.3243 0.0375
Maximum 7.4548 7.3123 0.9633
Standard deviation 1.1735 1.2537 0.1934
Skewness 0.5097 0.3998 2.5076
Kurtosis 2.0756 2.0017 8.5172
No. of observations 160 160 160
RP BIG – RP SMALL
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Differentials
RP BIG – CRUDE RP SMALL – CRUDE12
Figure 3: Weekly Movements of Differentials between Crude and Retail Prices
For the differential between the retail prices of big and small players, it is clear
that this has been following a declining trend, with the former consistently charging
higher pump prices than the latter (Figure 4). The average differential throughout the
period was 21 centavos (last column of Table 2), and this has narrowed down to around 9
centavos for the last 14 weeks of the sample. Generally, when one group initiates a price
adjustment that results in a spike in the differential, it elicits an instant reaction from the

























Figure 4: Weekly Movements of Differentials between Retail Prices
4 Econometric Models
To model the response structure of retail gasoline prices to crude oil price changes, three
econometric specifications were estimated. Each model contributed a critical piece in the
determination of the exact nature of retail price adjustments. We present here a brief
discussion of the outputs of these models and some qualifications; detailed exposition is
given in the appendix.
In the first model, an ordered probit regression is employed to capture the decision























and lagged changes in crude cost. This exercise is meant to determine the appropriate and
relevant lag length. It also lends itself to a determination of the influence of the import
duty suspension in the consideration of price adjustments.
In the second, we estimate a partial adjustment model (PAM) that gives us a
single parameter that measures the adjustment rate of retail prices to its long-run
equilibrium relation with crude cost. This is assumed to be of equal proportion in every
period, hence the caveat that price adjustments are constrained from behaving differently
in magnitude from one period to another. Also, it implies the counterintuitive
circumstance that the direction of the adjustment path is reversed when crude oil price
does, with the same proportion.
We extend this model by segregating positive and negative deviations from the
equilibrium relationship with crude cost and getting the corresponding adjustment rate
estimate. We compare the two parameter estimates to determine if price response speeds
differ when the retail price is above the long-run equilibrium path and when it is below it.
Lastly, we use a vector error correction model (VECM) to provide us with a
dynamic specification that captures the effects to current retail price adjustments of
current and lagged changes in crude cost and previous price movements, together with an
error-correction term. The resulting coefficient estimates will then be used in a
cumulative adjustment function that will show the cumulative response of gasoline prices
to an equivalent increase and decrease in crude cost. We compare the two resulting
cumulative response paths through time which will allow us to resolve the question of the
existence of price asymmetry in the Philippine retail gasoline market.15
The caveat in using t he cumulative adjustment function is that there is no
accommodation for the relative significance of the estimates and hence reliability may be
a problem as insignificant adjustments accumulate over time. Also, incremental steps may
make it appear that adjustments do happen each period, when in fact prices are sticky or
unchanging in the short run.
11
5 Results and Implications
After going through the various models, we now present the results and findings,
followed by a discussion of implications. We find strong support for the validity of these
specifications as evidenced by highly significant t- and F-statistics, with Durbin-Watson
statistics that are sufficiently close to 2. Varying degrees of R
2 and Adjusted R
2 were
obtained, some very high and others not, but this should not be seen as a handicap since
the theoretical grounding of the models are sound.
RESULTS AND FINDINGS
The results of the ordered probit model (Table 3) show that the firm’s decision to
decrease, maintain or increase prices is influenced by up to eight weeks of prior changes
in crude cost; beyond that, the coefficient estimates are insignificant. The Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) is also at its lowest at this eight-week lag length.
                                                
11 If price adjustments are far in between, which were in fact observed, an appropriate extension would be
the modeling of a threshold autoregression (TAR).16
All the coefficients have positive signs, consistent with the ordered dependent
variable Z wherein increases in crude prices will lead to increased chances of an upward
adjustment in retail prices. The most significant variable influencing the pricing decision
of the Big Three is the eighth-week lagged change in crude prices followed by the
seventh-week, while it is the fifth-week lagged change followed by the first-week for the
minor players. This result reflects the fact that the former group refines the gasoline that
they sell in the market, and hence some time elapses before the purchased crude gets to
the pump, in contrast to the new entrants who do not engage in processing but merely
import finished petroleum products for storage and resale.
12
                                                
12 According to a January 8, 2001 press release from Petron, it takes 45-55 days before the crude oil the
majors import gets refined and reaches retail stations, hence they face a long price adjustment timeframe




?CRUDE 0 0.7068 0.0832 1.2366 0.0043
?CRUDE -1 0.3010 0.4866 0.5977 0.1826
?CRUDE -2 0.3050 0.4785 0.2361 0.5977
?CRUDE -3 0.9138 0.0331 0.4190 0.3465
?CRUDE -4 0.6452 0.1284 0.7785 0.0798
?CRUDE -5 0.8108 0.0636 1.3907 0.0035
?CRUDE -6 0.9549 0.0327 1.0326 0.0286
?CRUDE -7 1.0457 0.0213 1.2403 0.0103
?CRUDE -8 1.0573 0.0129 0.8160 0.0665
?1 -1.2192 0.0000 -1.3361 0.0000
?2 1.0830 0.0000 1.3813 0.0000
Akaike info criterion 1.6172 1.4136
Log likelihood -111.0952 -95.7266
Pseudo R
2 0.2011 0.2558
No. of observations 151 151
ZBIG Z SMALL
Table 3: Ordered Probit Model
Estimate Estimate17
Figure 5 shows the estimated Z* for big and small players with the corresponding
limit points. Table 4 shows how the predictions from this regression fare with actual
observations; the estimated model has a positive bias for firms deciding to maintain
prices, with underestimation errors higher for the decision to increase retail prices.
Figure 5A: Estimated Latent Variable for Big Players
















3/20/99 9/20/99 3/20/00 9/20/00 3/20/01 9/20/01
Zsmall* ?1 ?218
If we graph the movement of retail prices with that of crude cost adjusted eight weeks
forward to account for the estimated response lag, we find that price adjustments now
move in the same direction as the underlying input cost (Figure 6). The fact that visible
turning points more or less coincide for both series lends credence to our determination of
an eight-week lag.
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1 2 3 1 2 3
Actual count 22 93 36 21 102 28
Count of obs with Max Prob 10 128 13 12 132 7
Error 12 -35 23 9 -30 21
Sum of all Probabilities 21.175 94.198 35.627 20.047 103.09 27.863
Error 0.825 -1.198 0.373 0.953 -1.09 0.137
Z BIG Z SMALL
Table 4: Estimation Errors in the Ordered Probit Model19
We also find that the import duty suspension dummy S is significant and positive
when included in the ordered probit model (Table 5). This means that such action has
resulted in increased probability of oil firms deciding to increase prices, or maintain
prices since the middle ranking is ambiguous, instead of lowering gasoline prices as
intended. This is statistically more significant for small players than big players.
For the difference between prevailing retail prices and the crude cost quoted eight
weeks before, it is apparent that this differential rose to a higher mean starting the week
of 1/13/2001 (period II in Table 6), by about P1.20 per liter for the Big Three and P1.40
per liter for the new players, about eight weeks after the onset of the import duty
suspension. The shaded area in Figure 7 indicates the three-month period this was in
effect after a lag of two months. This confirms the hypothesis that this institutional factor
brought about a significant change in the average level of the differential, with hints of
Dependent Variable: 
Variables p-value p-value
?CRUDE 0 0.8836 0.0367 1.5090 0.0009
?CRUDE -1 0.4023 0.3603 0.7559 0.1037
?CRUDE -2 0.4187 0.3398 0.4026 0.3816
?CRUDE -3 0.9469 0.0286 0.4720 0.2948
?CRUDE -4 0.7318 0.0897 0.9190 0.0442
?CRUDE -5 0.8138 0.0626 1.4182 0.0030
?CRUDE -6 1.1193 0.0148 1.3180 0.0075
?CRUDE -7 1.1564 0.0128 1.4284 0.0044
?CRUDE -8 1.2131 0.0059 1.0525 0.0236
S 0.6828 0.0855 1.0154 0.0154
?1 -1.1600 0.0000 -1.2583 0.0000
?2 1.1836 0.0000 1.5515 0.0000
Akaike info criterion 1.6108 1.3880
Log likelihood -109.6181 -92.7907
Pseudo R
2 0.2118 0.2786
No. of observations 151 151
ZBIG Z SMALL
Table 5: Ordered Probit Model with Import Duty Suspension Dummy
Estimate Estimate20
erosion and return to previous levels slow in coming. We further check on this in the next
model.
Figure 7: Weekly Movements of Lagged Differentials between Crude and Retail Prices
But first, the estimation of the long-run equilibrium relation between retail
gasoline prices and crude cost is presented in Table 7. Moving average terms up to the
eighth order were included, all highly significant, to accommodate the eight-week
I and II I II I and II I II
Mean 4.9530 4.4965 5.7184 4.7423 4.2327 5.6026
Median 4.7452 4.4169 5.8016 4.5883 4.1337 5.6621
Minimum 3.4605 3.4605 3.5350 3.2930 3.2930 3.4942
Maximum 6.9448 6.3603 6.9448 6.8673 6.1895 6.8673
Standard deviation 0.7958 0.5218 0.5796 0.8739 0.5790 0.5729
Skewness 0.3291 1.0093 -1.3285 0.2615 0.8834 -1.1974
Kurtosis 2.0041 4.6116 6.4370 1.9014 3.8675 6.1092
No. of observations 152 97 56 152 97 56
RP BIG – CRUDE -8 RP SMALL – CRUDE -8























adjustment lag the previous model strongly supported. Weekly dummies were not found
to be even nearly significant at the 10% level and are excluded in the table.
The passthrough rate was found to be higher for the Big Three at 90.5% compared
with 70.6% for the smaller group. This means that in the sample period considered the
big players passed along a bigger proportion of crude cost changes than the small players
did.
Figure 8 shows the predicted retail prices from the estimated equation vis-à-vis
the actual price. It is apparent from the graphs that the forecasts for both groups during
the sample coincided with, were above, or were below the prevailing gasoline prices
before crude cost reached its peak; from thereon gasoline prices were never lower than
Dependent Variable: 
Variables p-value p-value
constant 4.9581 0.0000 5.5284 0.0000
CRUDE 0.9052 0.0000 0.7063 0.0000
MA(1) 1.4845 0.0000 1.7319 0.0000
MA(2) 1.6926 0.0000 2.1086 0.0000
MA(3) 1.7472 0.0000 2.2884 0.0000
MA(4) 1.8790 0.0000 2.3672 0.0000
MA(5) 1.5278 0.0000 2.1293 0.0000
MA(6) 1.0673 0.0000 1.6918 0.0000
MA(7) 0.8708 0.0000 1.3511 0.0000
MA(8) 0.3150 0.0000 0.6022 0.0000
F-statistic 160.1081 0.0000 203.9557 0.0000
Sum squared resid 9.1581 7.7066
R
2 / Adjusted R
2 0.9901 0.9839 0.9922 0.9873
Durbin-Watson stat 1.9197 2.0054
No. of observations 160 160
RP BIG RP SMALL
Table 7: Long-Run Equilibrium Relationship
Estimate Estimate22
the predicted price. This implies a priori that adjustments were slow, or even nil, during
the said period.
Figure 8A: Actual and Predicted Retail Prices for Big Players

















































We now present the results of the PAM regression for the whole period in Table
8. The adjustment rates were merely 4.2% for the major players and 3.1% for the smaller
ones. For comparison, these are way below the estimates for the US retail gasoline market
obtained by Borenstein and Shepard (1996) from 1986 to 1992: 18.4% for branded
gasoline and 20.8% for unbranded. However, running a Chow breakpoint test for all
observations showed that a highly significant structural shift most likely happened on
10/7/2000.
13
Estimating the PAM for the two subsamples results in an adjustment rate of 9.4%
for the big players and 6.8% for the smaller firms in period I, slowing down to 2.4% and
1.7% respectively in period II (Tables 9 and 10). This suggests that  ceteris paribus
deregulation has not resulted in faster adjustment rates throughout the sample period but
the reverse, or equally plausible there was a factor or combination of factors that were
introduced that intervened with this process.
                                                
13 An assumption of the test is that no structural change happened at observations near and at the endpoints,
as observations should at least be as many as the parameters. Also, this excluded observations that
returned a near singular matrix and an expected positive or non-negative argument to the function.
Dependent Variable: 
Variables p-value p-value
RP* – RP -1 0.0424 0.0002 0.0305 0.0016
MA(1) 0.3005 0.0001 0.2397 0.0024
F-statistic 27.4128 0.0000 17.0298 0.0001
Sum squared resid 3.2585 4.1029
R
2 / Adjusted R
2 0.1486 0.1432 0.0979 0.0921
Durbin-Watson stat 2.0065 1.9817
Sample period 1/23/99 to 2/2/02 1/23/99 to 2/2/02
Chow breakpoint 10/7/00 0.0009 10/7/00 0.0000
No. of observations 159 159
?RP BIG ?RP SMALL
Table 8: Symmetric Partial Adjustment Model
Estimate Estimate24
To check on this more thoroughly, we again run the Chow test and find that the F-
statistic still returns highly significant breakpoints within the two periods: 3/18/2000 for
both groups in period I; 11/10/2001 for major players and 11/17/2001 for minor ones in
period II. We further break down the sample accordingly to better analyze the adjustment
through time. The results in Tables 11 and 12 indicate that the adjustment rate accelerated
within the first period: from 7.8% for the former and 6.4% for the latter in period IA, it
jumped to 15.9% and 15.6% respectively in period IB. For the second period, the
adjustment rates for both groups were not significantly different from zero in period IIA,
Dependent Variable: 
Variables p-value p-value
RP* – RP -1 0.0937 0.0001 0.0676 0.0016
MA(1) 0.2681 0.0132 0.3935 0.0002
F-statistic 6.8808 0.0103 9.9824 0.0022
Sum squared resid 1.6412 1.9939
R
2 / Adjusted R
2 0.0733 0.0626 0.1029 0.0926
Durbin-Watson stat 2.0175 2.0693
Sample period 1/23/99 to 9/30/00 1/23/99 to 9/30/00
Chow breakpoint 3/18/00 0.0084 3/18/00 0.0002
No. of observations 89 89
?RP BIG ?RP SMALL




RP* – RP -1 0.0241 0.0069 0.0172 0.0163
MA(1) 0.2662 0.0272 0.3321 0.0053
F-statistic 11.4670 0.0012 11.8817 0.0010
Sum squared resid 0.7299 0.6317
R
2 / Adjusted R
2 0.1461 0.1334 0.1506 0.1379
Durbin-Watson stat 1.9255 1.9488
Sample period 10/14/00 to 2/2/02 10/14/00 to 2/2/02
Chow breakpoint 11/10/01 0.0000 11/17/01 0.0000
No. of observations 69 69
?RP BIG ?RP SMALL
Table 10: Symmetric Partial Adjustment Model (Period II)
Estimate Estimate25
picking up in period IIB with a 5.1% adjustment rate for the established group and 4.6%
for the new entrants (Tables 13 and 14).
Dependent Variable: 
Variables p-value p-value
RP* – RP -1 0.0780 0.0001 0.0642 0.0014
MA(1) 0.3050 0.0191 0.5367 0.0000
F-statistic 10.3676 0.0021 22.0848 0.0000
Sum squared resid 0.6093 0.8601
R
2 / Adjusted R
2 0.1516 0.1370 0.2758 0.2633
Durbin-Watson stat 2.0552 2.0757
Sample period 1/23/99 to 3/11/00 1/23/99 to 3/11/00
No. of observations 60 60
?RP BIG ?RP SMALL








F-statistic 26.9094 0.0000 6.4576 0.0055
Sum squared resid 0.3245 0.3918
R
2 / Adjusted R
2 0.5086 0.4897 0.3406 0.2879
Durbin-Watson stat 1.8598 1.7581
Sample period 3/25/00 to 9/30/00 3/25/00 to 9/30/00
No. of observations 28 28
?RP BIG ?RP SMALL




RP* – RP -1 0.0139 0.1517 0.0091 0.2145
MA(1) 0.3687 0.0074 0.6202 0.0000
F-statistic 9.6310 0.0030 22.4282 0.0000
Sum squared resid 0.4820 0.3100
R
2 / Adjusted R
2 0.1514 0.1356 0.2897 0.2768
Durbin-Watson stat 1.8926 2.0350
Sample period 10/14/00 to 11/3/01 10/14/00 to 11/10/01
No. of observations 56 57
?RP BIG ?RP SMALL
Table 13: Symmetric Partial Adjustment Model (Period IIA)
Estimate Estimate26
The estimated parameters gain intuitive support by looking at the graph of retail
gasoline prices and the eight-week lagged crude cost partitioned according to the four
periods (Figure 9). In period IA retail prices mimicked the movement in crude cost, which
continued in period IB with more or less pronounced consonance in turning points.
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Dependent Variable: 
Variables p-value p-value
RP* – RP -1 0.0513 0.0085 0.0455 0.0388
MA(4) -0.8686 0.0000
MA(7) 0.8850 0.0000
F-statistic 12.5342 0.0054 19.5108 0.0017
Sum squared resid 0.0703 0.0567
R
2 / Adjusted R
2 0.5562 0.5119 0.6843 0.6493
Durbin-Watson stat 2.1320 1.7644
Sample period 11/17/01 to 2/2/02 11/24/01 to 2/2/02
No. of observations 12 11
?RP BIG ?RP SMALL
Table 14: Symmetric Partial Adjustment Model (Period IIB)
Estimate Estimate27
We now dissect the crucial events that happened in the 13-month long period IIA.
On the week of October 7, 2000, the breakpoint to this period, the oil companies sharply
raised their retail prices by P1 per liter on account of warranted escalation in crude prices.
From thereon it didn't move for 32 weeks, leaving open the question of overshooting
considering a continued climb in crude cost, and when it did on the week of January 13,
2001, it was but a meager rollback considering the steep decline in crude prices.
Coincidentally, this was also about eight weeks since the suspension of the import duty
on crude and finished petroleum products took effect. Retail prices were not adjusted
downward at all for the next four months even if crude cost has generally softened; after
this, retail prices tracked movements in crude prices albeit at an apparently higher
differential.
In period IIB the oil companies seem to have favorably reacted to the decrease in
crude prices with continued downward price adjustments that mirrored this decline. As
such we have seen a return to an adjustment rate significantly different from zero.
The striking coincidence of the decrease in gasoline prices in period IIA further
verifies the eight-week response lag of retail prices to input cost changes. Also, it appears
that the temporary suspension of the import duty did not result in a relief for consumers
as previously intended, but was instead taken advantage by oil firms to maintain a higher
profit margin, assuming changes in other input costs did not significantly enter its basic
cost structure. Variables that we surmise have allowed this widening of the differential
between retail prices and crude cost to initially happen were the mini-supply shock
successfully staged by OPEC and the coincidental depreciation of the peso against the
dollar. Obviously, the resulting increase in crude cost was the consideration for the28
introduction of the institutional factor. The tense political situation in the country during
this time may have provided the environment for this to persist and not be checked by the
otherwise much-occupied public.
Contrary to public perception, the Big Three had consistently faster adjustment
rates than the new oil players in all subsamples. This may indicate that essentially the
smaller group is a price follower, always pricing its products a few centavos lower than
the Big Three, except perhaps for the not-too-often price decreases it initiates which are
minimal and quickly matched.
We now turn to the asymmetric version of the PAM. The results are presented in
Table 15, and it clearly shows that for both groups, retail prices adjusted faster when it is
below the predicted long-run equilibrium price: 11.4% against 2.6% for big players and
7.7% against a mere 1.8% for smaller ones.
Wald equivalence tests were strongly rejected at the 1% significance level so that
we conclude that price adjustment speeds differ, conditional on the deviation of the
prevailing retail price from the equilibrium price path being positive or negative. When
there are so-called under-recoveries, the adjustment speed is relatively fast; however,
when it is the opposite, we see a slow adjustment.
Dependent Variable: 
Variables p-value p-value
(RP* – RP -1)
+ 0.1136 0.0000 0.0769 0.0002
(RP* – RP -1)
– 0.0255 0.0291 0.0175 0.0948
MA(1) 0.2771 0.0005 0.2312 0.0037
F-statistic 19.9425 0.0000 12.3604 0.0000
Sum squared resid 3.0482 3.9259
R
2 / Adjusted R
2 0.2036 0.1934 0.1368 0.1257
Durbin-Watson stat 2.0177 1.9877
Wald equivalence test 10.8030 0.0013 7.0067 0.0090
Sample period 1/23/99 to 2/2/02 1/23/99 to 2/2/02
No. of observations 159 159
?RP BIG ?RP SMALL





+ 0.0746 0.4055 0.0501 0.6240
(?CRUDE -1)
+ 0.0491 0.5914 0.1065 0.2932
(?CRUDE -2)
+ 0.1090 0.1290 0.1440 0.0508
(?CRUDE -3)
+ 0.0628 0.3660 0.0987 0.1860
(?CRUDE -4)
+ 0.3184 0.0000 0.2413 0.0012
(?CRUDE -5)
+ 0.0780 0.2929 0.1180 0.1080
(?CRUDE -6)
+ 0.0910 0.2218 0.0628 0.4124
(?CRUDE -7)
+ 0.1469 0.1285 0.1652 0.1251
(?CRUDE -8)
+ 0.1143 0.2061 0.0456 0.6569
(?CRUDE 0)
– 0.0223 0.7728 0.0995 0.2591
(?CRUDE -1)
– -0.0113 0.8892 -0.0999 0.2650
(?CRUDE -2)
– 0.0016 0.9794 0.0635 0.3387
(?CRUDE -3)
– 0.1046 0.0832 -0.0265 0.6817
(?CRUDE -4)
– -0.0281 0.6494 0.0648 0.3034
(?CRUDE -5)
– 0.0859 0.1546 0.0588 0.3624
(?CRUDE -6)
– 0.1317 0.0401 0.1748 0.0094
(?CRUDE -7)
– 0.1587 0.0617 0.0990 0.2946
(?CRUDE -8)
– 0.1017 0.2485 0.1410 0.1449
(?RP -1)
+ 0.0726 0.4195 0.0404 0.6466
(?RP -2)
+ -0.1805 0.0233 -0.1242 0.0693
(?RP -3)
+ -0.0587 0.4476 -0.1334 0.0555
(?RP -4)
+ -0.1804 0.0156 -0.1255 0.0750
(?RP -5)
+ -0.0141 0.8490 -0.0975 0.1351
(?RP -6)
+ -0.0250 0.7318 -0.0294 0.6637
(?RP -7)
+ 0.3836 0.0000 0.4763 0.0000
(?RP -8)
+ -0.3102 0.0010 -0.2153 0.0187
(?RP -1)
– -0.2777 0.2188 -0.2901 0.2719
(?RP -2)
– -0.2543 0.1219 -0.1569 0.3667
(?RP -3)
– 0.3699 0.0256 0.2904 0.0986
(?RP -4)
– 0.0784 0.6574 0.1589 0.4259
(?RP -5)
– 0.0814 0.6418 0.2855 0.1545
(?RP -6)
– -0.0927 0.5984 -0.3200 0.1086
(?RP -7)
– 0.7425 0.0001 0.8970 0.0001
(?RP -8)
– -0.0648 0.7825 -0.2284 0.4487
RP - 1 – RP -1* -0.0141 0.0868 -0.0107 0.0916
MA(7) -0.9317 0.0000 -0.9317 0.0000
F-statistic 4.3835 0.0000 3.4451 0.0000
Sum squared resid 1.6366 2.2165
R
2 / Adjusted R
2 0.5716 0.4412 0.5118 0.3633
Durbin-Watson stat 1.9918 1.9792
No. of observations 151 151
?RP BIG ?RP SMALL
Table 16: Vector Error Correction Model
Estimate Estimate30
The results of the vector error correction model (VECM) are presented in Table
16.
14 The corresponding cumulative adjustments to a one-time change in crude oil prices
are shown in Table 17 and illustrated in Figure 10. The regression indicates that after
eight weeks,
15 the big and small oil players have passed on almost 90% of the crude cost
increase to retail consumers, while they have decreased prices by only 58% and 46%
respectively for a similar decrease in crude cost.
16
                                                
14 Since an error correction model is used for cointegrating regressions, we first tested the appropriateness
of the model by checking for the nonstationarity, or equivalently the existence of a unit root, of the retail
price and crude cost series. Secondly, the first differences were checked for stationarity. The Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests revealed that the null hypothesis of a unit root for levels with an intercept and
p=8 could not be rejected for all the series at the 1% critical value. For the first differences, the same null
hypothesis was rejected at the 1% significance level for crude and at 5% for both retail price series.
Hence we treated all of the series as I(1) and proceeded with the VECM. The residual from the estimation
of the VECM was indeed found to be stationary at the 1% significance level.
15 We consider this as the full lifetime of the price adjustments since the cumulative response estimates get
noisier and slowly taper off beyond the eighth week.
16 The two cumulative response paths do not converge unlike that observed by Borenstein, Cameron, and
Gilbert (1997) in the US market from 1986 to 1992.
Weeks Increase Decrease Increase Decrease
0 0.0746 0.0223 0.0501 0.0995
1 0.1409 0.0250 0.1657 0.0101
2 0.2519 0.0351 0.3139 0.0946
3 0.3156 0.1510 0.4017 0.0788
4 0.6096 0.1359 0.6098 0.1060
5 0.6820 0.2145 0.6871 0.1396
6 0.7018 0.3563 0.6844 0.2748
7 0.8366 0.5007 0.8082 0.4413
8 0.8994 0.5794 0.8530 0.4586
Table 17: Cumulative Adjustment Function
RP BIG RP SMALL31
Figure 10A: Cumulative Responses to Equivalent Crude Cost Changes for Big Players
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At all periods the adjustment to a crude cost increase is higher than that for a
crude cost decrease except for the minor players at the contemporaneous period; the small
players appear capable of partially lowering retail prices based on current week decreases
in crude cost. However, this action is effectively reversed the next week.
An upward trend is visibly seen for cumulative responses to crude cost increases
for both groups across the period, unlike that of downward adjustments that are nil until
the second week and above 20% and increasing only on the fifth week for big players.
While the price response of new entrants to the crude cost decrease is a 10% adjustment
in the second week, it remains in that average level and picks up only in the sixth week.
The two adjustment paths sufficiently support the view that there is indeed an
asymmetry in adjustment speed and the resulting terminal cumulative response to an
equivalent movement in crude cost favoring retail price increases. This asymmetry is at
its highest in the fourth week for major oil players and the fifth week for the small players
(Figure 11).
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There has been no indication however of firms increasing prices in response to a
decrease in crude cost or an overshooting of price increases for the aggregate sample in
this model. The eight-week lag explains the seeming opposite reaction or non-response,
but actually gradual adjustment of retail prices to current (and recent) changes in crude
cost; prices are still being adjusted for previous changes, with the current change not
having much of an effect until later.
The passthrough rate of a crude cost decrease is nowhere close to unity at the end
of eight weeks unlike that of a crude cost increase; this suggests market inflexibility and
positive economic profits in the downstream oil industry during the period studied.
IMPLICATIONS
This empirical exercise has demonstrated that contrary to public perception, the
deregulation of the downstream oil industry has resulted in acceleration through time of
the adjustment speed of retail prices to crude cost changes, if not for an intervening
factor. The suspension of the import duty on crude oil and petroleum products,
precipitated by a mini-supply shock and currency depreciation, has allowed firms to set
prices that strayed away from the long-run equilibrium path. However, we see in the
general picture that the basic institutional environment of a deregulated industry has
fostered competition and a general trend towards faster adjustment rates through time.
With regards to price asymmetry, we find that this is indeed the case for the
country’s retail gasoline market. Retail prices are adjusted much faster for an increase in
crude cost than for a commensurate decrease, with the cumulative adjustment passed on34
to consumers in the terminal period significantly higher for the former. The resulting
differential is assumed to amount to positive economic profits enjoyed in the industry for
the period studied.
The present situation wherein small players seem to be price-followers and do not
aggressively cut pump prices may constitute a non-unique Nash equilibrium. In this
perspective it is assumed that oil firms are already content with the returns or payoff they
are respectively getting, and hence would not deviate from their revealed strategies. This
would result in the present market configuration perpetuating itself.
But a very probable challenge to this Nash equilibrium is that m arket forces,
which are continuously at work (i.e. the ubiquitous profit motive), would eventually push
industry economic profits to zero given time and an unrestrained environment. This can
be achieved either through the entry of more firms, as the industry is in fact contestable,
and/or the increased intensity of competition between current players. Hence we can
expect that a more competitive industry structure will in due course emerge. Then we
might say that the first Nash equilibrium is but temporary, and that the dust will
ultimately settle on a socially superior Nash equilibrium imitative of the competitive
outcome.
We notice that the small oil players have been continuously gaining market share
at the expense of the Big Three (Table 18).
17 Also, some of them have already banded
together, establishing the New Petroleum Players Association (NPPA), a move aimed at
protecting their common interests and exploring possible linkages and scale economies
                                                
17 The market share of the new players was forecast to reach a low of 12% and a high of 13% in 2001,
according to the October 27, 2001 edition of the Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI).35
(e.g. mergers, shared depots and product terminals). Add to that expansion plans that are
admittedly ambitious, we see that the minor players are gearing up for a more forceful
showing.
It is my inference that since the new players only have so many retail stations at
present,
18 it is not currently feasible to price gasoline way lower than the big players’
posted retail prices. They can only service so much of the market so that effectively, they
face a capacity constraint. Thus a critical mass, when reached, is expected to trigger fierce
price competition in the industry.
Analogously, we can also observe moves by the Big Three to enhance loyalty
among its customers. The usual lot are advertisements, sponsorships of sports activities,
membership clubs for certain market segments (e.g. jeepney and tricycle drivers), and
raffle promos for its patrons, even credit card tie-ins for fuel rebates. The most substantial
move they are now undertaking is the expansion of the gasoline station-cum-convenience
store concept by leasing adjacent lots to concessionaires such as fastfoods, restaurants and
the like, a not uncertain attempt at affording themselves greater market power through
bundling.
                                                
18 Industry players other than the Big Three had only 89 stations in Metro Manila and 441 stations in the
country as of yearend 2001, 16.2% and 11.2% of total, respectively.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000Q1 2001Q1
Petron 41.1 40.1 39.1 35.7 35.6 34.9
Shell 33.6 33.6 34.5 35.6 32.5 33.3
Caltex 24.6 22.9 22.1 21.0 22.3 21.6
Others 0.7 3.4 4.3 8.7 9.6 10.2
Source: Department of Energy
Table 18: Market Shares (%)36
Thus policy moves should be aimed at fostering greater competition, by perhaps
mitigating the incumbent advantages of major oil firms and further lowering entry
barriers (e.g. tax perks) if one is an activist, with the attendant danger of introducing new
distortions in the market. Otherwise, consumers would fare much better if the
downstream oil industry is left alone and the long arm of government intervention is
tied,
19 allowing competitive forces to freely carry out its work.
6 Summary and Conclusion
We find in this paper the initial attempt to empirically model the nature of price
adjustments in the Philippine retail gasoline market since its full deregulation in 1998,
including the relative speed with which this was accomplished through time and the
determination of the supposed existence of an asymmetry in price response to crude cost
changes.
The decision to adjust retail prices depends on eight weeks of previous changes in
crude cost. This lag length explains the seemingly anachronistic response of price
adjustments to crude cost changes.
                                                
19 Assuming a level-playing field is already ensured. The new players have been complaining of unjustly
higher access and royalty fees proposed to be levied by the Philippine National Construction Company
(PNCC) in setting up service stations in the North and South Luzon Expressways (PDI, July 6, 2001).
Apparently, the Big Three had a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with the PNCC for the exclusive
rights to build facilities in the said tollways. This was resolved recently with the invalidation of the MOA
and the application of uniform tariff rates (PDI, January 16, 2002).37
The adjustment of retail prices to crude cost changes has in general accelerated
through time. The suspension of the import duty on crude and petroleum products,
following a mini-supply shock and currency depreciation, was an intervening factor that
disrupted this trend.
We find evidence to support the casual observation that retail prices respond
quicker and more fully to an increase in crude prices rather than to a similar decrease.
This is indicative of positive economic profits in the downstream oil industry and
consequently, there is room for increased competition and efficiency.38
Appendix
ORDERED PROBIT MODEL
In the ordered probit model, we considered a  t  x  1 latent vector  Z* which is
linearly dependent on the t x k explanatory vector X, consisting of the current and lagged
changes in crude prices:
,     ' e + b = X Z* (1)
where e is a random term. The decision of the oil players to decrease, maintain or increase
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The  k  x  1 parameter vector ß indicates the direction of the change in the
probability of falling into the endpoint rankings as  X changes; the Prob(Z=1) moves
opposite the sign of an estimated ßk while the Prob(Z=3) changes in the same direction as
the sign of an estimated ß k. The magnitude of the ß k estimates shows the relative
importance of the corresponding first difference in crude cost to the decision of the oil
players to change gasoline prices.39
The lag length k-1
20 was identified using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC),
which selects the value of k that minimizes
, 2 ) ( max 2 ) AIC( r L k k + y - = (4)
where r is the number of parameters and L(yk) is the maximum likelihood function.
PARTIAL ADJUSTMENT MODEL
The partial adjustment model (PAM) involved the estimation of
, ) * ( 1 t t t t RP RP RP m + - t = D - (5)
where RPt* denotes the predicted retail price from the prior estimation of the long-run
21
equilibrium relationship between gasoline and crude prices:
￿
=
e + h + a + a =
51
1
, 1 0 ,
w
t t w w t WEEK CRUDE RP (6)
where  WEEK are dummy variables for the week of the year.
22 The parameter a 1
represents the long-run passthrough rate,
23 while a0 is included to capture other input
costs and the firms’ average margin. In (5), t measures the rate of adjustment towards the
long-run retail price.
We checked on the asymmetry of partial adjustments by estimating






                                                
20 This is because we indexed the contemporaneous weekly change in crude prices with k=0.
21 In this case, the long-run spans just a little over three years.
22 A 53
rd week dummy was used for 2000.
23 Prior studies indicate that this parameter should be nearly equal to one since the production process is
capable of converting one barrel of crude oil into close to one barrel of gasoline, with provision for
refinery fuels used and losses due to inefficiencies.40
in which observations were segregated into positive and negative deviations from the
equilibrium relationship estimated in (6) before entering the equation. Accordingly,
)} * ( , 0 max{ ) * ( 1 1 -
+
- - = - t t t t RP RP RP RP (8)
   and
)}. * ( , 0 min{ ) * ( 1 1 -
-
- - = - t t t t RP RP RP RP (9)
VECTOR ERROR CORRECTION MODEL
In the vector error correction model (VECM), we estimated the cointegrating
regression
, *) (               
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where k was the lag length determined from the ordered probit model. The parameter di
captures the current change in retail prices given the change in crude cost t-i periods
before. Crude cost movements were separated into positive and negative changes,
applying the same procedure as in (8) and (9), to differentiate gasoline price responses
between the two.
The effects of previous adjustments in retail prices were added for a richer
specification that allows intertemporal response interactions, together with an error-
correction term that is the one-period lagged difference between the retail price and its
predicted counterpart from (6) to account for the reversion towards the long-run
equilibrium.41
The estimated VECM is then used to determine the adjustment path of retail
prices to crude cost changes through time. The cumulative response D of retail gasoline
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where ° is accordingly replaced by either 
+ or 
– representing the adjustment of interest.
24
This cumulative adjustment function sums up the effects of the contemporaneous change
in crude cost, previous adjustments made, previous changes in the resulting retail prices,
and the tendency to move towards the long-run equilibrium relation.
                                                
24 This was first used by Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert (1997).42
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